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Scholars seeking to understand political competition in Europe have proposed various models of political dimensionality. 
While most scholars draw on data from the supply side of politics (political parties), demand side (voter) studies remain 
few. In this paper we compare the two approaches. The main difference is that while supply side approaches suggest a 
single model of dimensionality that can be applied to all EU countries, demand side approaches suggest a greater degree 
of divergence. In particular, the bundle of issues commonly identified by supply side studies as TAN/GAL not only fail to 
form a coherent dimension when viewed from a demand side perspective, but incorporate issues of EU integration in 
some (northern European) cases, but not in others.
Introduction
The dimensionality of the political space in Europe has long been a focus of debate amongst 
scholars. While some authors are convinced that the left-right dimension remains the only 
principal dimension that defines politics in Europe (Bartolini and Mair 1990), others suggest a 
two-dimensional space that is framed by an economic dimension of free-market capitalism versus 
state regulation and a social dimension that pits libertarians against authoritarians (Kitschelt 
1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Marks et al. 2006), or even a three-dimensional space that 
also incorporates a dimension relating either to EU integration (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012) 
or to issues of group identity (Kitschelt 2013). While most studies into the dimensionality of 
the political space focus on the supply side of politics (i.e. political parties) (Marks et al. 2006; 
Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012), the focus of this paper is on the demand side, i.e. the orientations 
of ordinary voters.
The starting point of this paper will be the series of studies that draw from the Chapel Hill 
expert survey of political parties based at the University of North Carolina. This group of scholars 
first proposed two dimensions to describe the European political space: one economic (left-right) 
dimension and one cultural (TAN/GAL) dimension (Hooghe, Marks, and Wilson 2002; Marks 
et al. 2006). Bakker et al. (2012) went on to propose a third dimension relating to European 
integration. While these models may adequately describe the supply side of politics, they have 
yet to be tested comprehensively on the demand side. With this end in mind, we test them on the 
political orientations of over half a million EU citizens who completed a survey administered 
via an online tool called a Voting Advice Application (VAA). We first attempt to replicate the 
findings of Bakker et al. (2012) on this data using their own pre-defined dimensions, before 
adopting a more inductive approach in order to identify the models (and dimensions) that best fit 
the data in each country.
We find that while certain key features of the political space that are identified in the supply side 
studies are also revealed in demand-side studies, on the demand side there is greater heterogeneity
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between countries than supply-side studies suggest. While supply side studies suggest that a
single overarching dimensional model provides a ‘best fit” solution in all countries, our own study
suggests that on the demand side the dimensionality of the political space can only be generalised
to relatively small clusters of countries. We also find that European issues do not, in most cases,
form an independent dimension of their own, but may instead either cluster together with the
cultural dimension or (more rarely) form a part of the economic dimension. Finally, we show that
the issues that the Chapel Hill group of scholars label as TAN/GAL do not form a coherent scale
in any European country if we base our analysis on demand-side data. In many cases the cultural
dimension draws from “identity” issues involving immigration and EU integration.
The rest of paper will proceed as follows. The next two sections provide an overview of the
literature relating to the dimensionality of the political space and set out the overall approach and
aims of the paper. The subsequent section describes the data source and methods used to identify
latent ideological dimensions. Next, the results of the analysis are outlined and the extent to which
the patterns observed confirm or contradict the expectations of supply-side studies are explained.
The paper ends with a discussion of the broader relevance of the findings and a brief conclusion.
The dimensionality of the political space
In terms of the number of dimensions needed to define (or approximate a definition of) the
European political space, the simplest model is a one dimensional model defined by a single
left-right dimension. In the twentieth century, left and right were used above all as a label for
rival economic ideologies with the left favouring a state directed economy and redistribution of
wealth from the rich to the poor, and the right preferring a free market economy unfettered by
state control. With the emergence of the so-called “new politics” in the late 1960s and 1970s,
non-economic, “post-materialist” values such as environmentalism, minority rights and freedom
of lifestyle choices also became the object of political contestation (Inglehart 1984). Some
authors saw these values transforming the left-right dimension into “an amorphous vessel whose
meaning varies in systematic ways with the underlying political and economic conditions in a
given society” (Huber and Inglehart 1995, 90). Others, however, proposed that they constitute a
separate ideological dimension.
Advocates of a two-dimensional political space hold that “new politics” issues form a separate
cultural dimension. Kitschelt refers to this second dimension as a libertarian-authoritarian dimen-
sion (Kitschelt 1994; Kitschelt and McGann 1995), while Marks et al. admit that it “summarizes
several non-economic issues—ecological, lifestyle, and communal—and is correspondingly more
diverse than the Left/Right dimension” (Marks et al. 2006, 157). Accordingly they assign it
a rather complex label, TAN/GAL (an acronym for traditional-authoritarian-nationalist versus
green-alternative-libertarian). According to this schema, which is used to define the positions of
European political parties in the oft-cited Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES), the cultural dimen-
sion embraces issues involving personal lifestyle (such as gay marriage, abortion, euthanasia),
law and order, the role of religion, immigration, multiculturalism and environmentalism (Bakker
et al. 2015). It exists alongside an economic dimension that embraces traditional left-right issues
such as the role of the state in the economy, government spending, deregulation and redistribution
of wealth.
There remains the question of how issues relating to EU integration fit into this dimensional
structure. Drawing from CHES expert codings on the positions of all significant EU political
parties on a range of issues in 2006, Bakker et al. (2012) use confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
3to show how the European political space—as defined by the supply side, i.e. the positions of
political parties—best conforms to a three dimensional model defined by an (economic) left-right
dimension and a (cultural) TAN/GAL dimension, with EU issues forming a separate dimension
sui generis. Costello et al., who also use a CFA model, find that a three dimensional model works
best when analysing policy congruence between voters and representatives in the European policy
space. Specifically, they find “an economic left/right dimension, a cultural dimension [and] a
dimension capturing attitudes towards the EU” (Costello, Thomassen, and Rosema 2012, 1245).
While Bakker et al. (2012) suggest that a three-dimensional model best fits the data in all EU
countries, they also show that these dimensions correlate strongly with one another in different
directions in different countries. They find that in most Western European countries, the economic
left-right dimension and the TAN/GAL dimension correlate in such a way that economically
left-wing parties tend to be GAL, while economically right-wing parties tend to be TAN. In
most (but not all) of post-communist Europe, however, a reverse correlation applies whereby
economically left parties are more likely to be TAN and economically right parties GAL, partially
confirming an earlier finding of Marks et al. (2006). At the same time, Bakker et al. (2012)
observe some heterogeneity amongst post-communist countries, with Hungary demonstrating the
strongest associations between left and TAN on the one hand and right and GAL on the other, but
with Estonia, Latvia and, most notably, Slovenia exhibiting the same pattern that is observed in
(most) western European countries. Rovny suggests that this is because former communist parties
in countries that had previously belonged to communist federations (the USSR and Yugoslavia)
tend to represent ethnic minorities and are therefore more multiculturalist or “GAL” in their
orientation (Rovny 2014).
Bakker et al. (2012) also show that in most EU countries, economically right-wing parties
tend to be more pro-EU than left-wing parties, although the correlation is weak in the original
EU-6 and runs in the reverse direction in the UK, where economically right-wing parties tend to
be more Eurosceptic than left wing-parties. Finally, they find that TAN parties tend to be more
Eurosceptic and GAL parties more pro-EU, but this tendency does not apply in Estonia, Germany,
Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, where a reverse correlation seems to apply (Bakker, Jolly,
and Polk 2012).
The work of Bakker et al. (2012) draws from the 2006 CHES party codings and therefore
their findings refer to Europe prior to the European Debt Crisis. According to Hooghe and
Marks (2018), this crisis increased the salience of European integration as an issue and led to
a rift between northern creditor countries and southern debtor countries in terms of political
competition. While in the north culturally right-wing, Eurosceptic TAN parties have benefitted,
in the south resentment against austerity has led to a rise in radical (economic) left parties. In a
similar vein, Otjes and Katsanidou (2017) argue that after the European sovereign debt crisis “in
the Southern European debtor states economic and European issues are merging as a result of a
strong European interference in their economic policy” (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017, 301), but
that in Northern European countries issues of EU integration are associated with immigration
and the cultural dimension of political competition.
Table 1 replicates Bakker et al.’s correlations between economic left versus right, social left
versus right (or TAN/GAL) and the European integration dimension in all EU member states
using the 2014 CHES data.1 Once again we observe that TAN parties tend to more Eurosceptic
1As in Bakker et al. (2012), the variables used in the correlation are expert codes on parties’ (left-right)
ideological stance on economic issues, on their position on the TAN/GAL axis (from libertarian/postmaterialist to
traditional/authoritarian) and on their overall positions towards European Integration. We follow the lead of Bakker et al.
(2012) in using Pearson’s correlation coefficient. Table 1 in this paper corresponds to Table 1 in Bakker et al. (2012),
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in most countries, but this time we observe a rather clearer picture than that reported in Bakker et
al. (2012) with strong correlations in this direction both for most northern European creditor
countries and for post-communist countries with the exception of Slovenia. In the so-called “bail
out” countries of Cyprus, Ireland, Portugal and Spain (so labelled because they were forced to
accept a bail out by international financial organisations in return for sharp cuts in government
spending)—as well as in Slovenia, which imposed its own harsh austerity package in response to
the debt crisis—GAL parties were generally less favourable to European integration than TAN
parties. This would appear to support the above-mentioned arguments of Otjes and Katsanidou
(2017) and Hooghe and Marks (2018). Greece is the only bail out country that appears to buck this
trend, with the correlation running in the opposite direction. In terms of the correlations between
the economic left-right dimension and the TAN/GAL dimension we still see the aforementioned
divide between Western Europe and post-communist Europe, although by 2014 Poland, as well
as Slovenia, corresponded more to a “Western” model in which GAL is associated with the
economic left and TAN with the economic right.
table 1: Updated CHES correlations, 2014
Country
Economic and
social left/right
Economic left/
right and EU
Social left/
right and EU
Austria 0.37 -0.28 -0.60
Bulgaria -0.65 0.63 -0.68
Cyprus 0.82 0.39 0.25
Czech Republic 0.03 -0.23 -0.30
Denmark 0.23 0.43 -0.05
England 0.85 -0.65 -0.76
Estonia -0.05 0.32 -0.48
Finland 0.13 0.39 -0.64
France 0.65 0.19 -0.29
Germany 0.36 -0.14 -0.58
Greece 0.08 0.45 -0.54
Hungary -0.09 0.14 -0.89
Ireland 0.63 0.82 0.51
Italy 0.64 0.25 0.00
Latvia -0.23 0.65 -0.40
Lithuania -0.36 0.41 -0.67
Netherlands 0.29 0.23 -0.59
Poland 0.19 -0.42 -0.71
Portugal 0.62 0.79 0.38
Romania -0.43 0.52 -0.50
Slovakia -0.43 -0.18 -0.12
Slovenia 0.81 0.49 0.36
Spain 0.71 0.56 0.43
Sweden 0.41 0.57 -0.13
p.229. The only difference is that for the United Kingdom we consider only parties that exist in England (omitting the
Scottish National Party and Plaid Cymru) to conform with our analysis of demand-side data later in the paper.
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to the demand side (i.e. potential voters)? Cleavage theory suggests that the dimensions that
define the policy space correspond to fundamental divides in society that emerged as a result
of the formation of modern nation states in Europe and subsequent systemic changes such as
industrialisation. Lipset and Rokkan propose that four societal cleavages—centre versus periphery,
state versus church, land versus industry and owner versus worker—have been shaping patterns
of political contestation in Europe since the nineteenth century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967). While
the industrial revolution and the associated cleavage between owner and worker have meant
that most European countries share a common economic left-right dimension, cleavage theory
would suggest that the relevance and possibly the number of other relevant dimensions will vary
according to the different cleavage structures that engendered them.
Recent events have led to a revived interest in cleavage theory. Kriesi et al. contend that a
new cleavage—that between “winners” and “losers” of globalisation—has, over recent years,
transformed the political space in Europe, leading to the strategic repositioning of existing political
parties and even the emergence of new ones (Kriesi et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008). In a similar
vein, Hooghe and Marks identify what they refer to as a “trasnational cleavage, which has as its
core a political reaction against European integration and immigration” (Hooghe and Marks 2018,
109). The thrust of Hooghe and Marks’ argument is that cleavage structures continue to drive
party system change today and identify the breakthrough of a radical right party in Germany as
one of the most stunning consequences of the new cleavage (110). If indeed it is demand that
creates supply, we would expect that changes in the way ideological dimensions are configured on
the demand side (i.e. at mass level) will drive any corresponding changes on the supply side (i.e.
at the level of parties). This justifies the focus on this paper on the former, rather than the latter.
If the proposed new cleavage does indeed represent a new and growing divide in European
societies, we would expect the ideological divide that corresponds to it to encompass issues
relating to the role of the nation state in response to globalisation and Europeanisation. Hooghe
and Marks suggest that it is highly correlated with TAN/GAL (123), but not all issues that are
encapsulated in TAN/GAL are necessarily part of it. While nationalism is clearly its defining
hallmark, green issues would only be relevant insofar as they relate to global regulation over
environmental policy (such as the Paris Agreement on global warming), and issues of authority or
law and order are not logically connected to this new divide. Kriesi et al. talk of a “transformation
of the cultural dimension” (Kriesi et al. 2006, 950) through the incorporation into it of issues such
as immigration and EU integration, and suggest the alternative label of (cultural) “demarcation”
versus “integration” for this dimension. Since the decision of the United Kingdom to leave the
European Union and the election of Donald Trump as president of the United States in 2016,
journalists and political commentators have sometimes referred to this identity-based dimension as
“open” versus “closed”2 or “people from somewhere” versus “people from anywhere” (Goodhart
2017). Kitschelt distinguishes it from the libertarian-authoritarian aspects of TAN/GAL, proposing
an alternative three dimensional model that includes one economic left-right dimension, one
libertarian-authoritarian dimension and one identity-based dimension that draws on issues of
ethnicity, immigration and European integration (Kitschelt 2013).
It is quite possible that the new “transnational” cleavage, like some of Lipset and Rokkan’s
earlier cleavages, will manifest itself in different ways in different countries, especially in terms
of the ideological conflicts it engenders. In particular, it is likely that the varying legacies of past
policy choices, the relative strengths of different socioeconomic groups in society and the state’s
2See for example, The Economist (30 July 2016), “Globalisation and Politics: The New Political Divide”; Tristram
Hunt, “Closed v Open”, NewStatesman (6-12 January 2017).
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(differential) capacity for intervention mean that European policy-makers are destined to respond
to the systemic challenges of globalisation and financial crisis in different ways (Beramendi
et al. 2015a; Häusermann and Kriesi 2015). The strategies they adopt will inevitably generate
new political conflicts that will play out in different ways in different countries. The issue of
European integration (see above), as well as mass and elite reactions to it, is perhaps a case in
point here. As Otjes and Katsanidou (2017) suggest, globalisation and Europeanisation may be
seen through an economic lens in Southern European debtor countries, where externally-imposed
austerity policies bite hardest. In Northern European creditor countries, on the other hand, the
new cleavage may be more likely to manifest itself as a cultural divide between “open” and
“closed”. The question we must address is therefore: Can we talk about a single European policy
space when we look at the demand side of politics, or must we instead consider different European
policy spaces?
Aims and approach
To explain our aims in this paper it is important to first outline existing approaches to the study
of political dimensionality. De Vries and Marks (2012) identify two approaches for theorising
dimensionality. The first is a strategic approach that considers the policy space and the latent
dimensions that define it to be the result of a strategic struggle between political parties. Parties
shape the policy space by determining whether or not a particular issue is salient (De Vries and
Marks 2012, 187–188). This “top-down” approach for identifying dimensions has variously
involved analysing party manifestos (Stoll 2010), using expert surveys to position parties on certain
broad issue areas (Marks et al. 2006; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012) or drawing from roll-call
votes at the European parliament (Hix, Noury, and Roland 2006). The second is a sociological or
“bottom-up” approach that assumes that political competition is based on historically-embedded
conflicts within society, an approach that goes back to Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) study of
societal cleavages (De Vries and Marks 2012, 187). This approach typically draws on opinion
surveys; an example is Henjak’s analysis of European Value Survey (EVS) and World Value
Survey (WVS) opinion data to explore the effect of certain value orientations on party choice
(Henjak 2010). Essentially this is a difference between supply side and demand side approaches.
Given our interest in the possible emergence of a new cleavage that relates to transnationalism and
globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006; Hooghe and Marks 2018) and the likelihood that this cleavage is
bringing about a change in patterns of political competition, it is this second approach that we
adopt in this paper.
Both demand side and supply side approaches have their advantages and disadvantages. The
supply side approach and the use of expert codes to determine party positions is by far the
best established method for exploring dimensionality and has delivered real and meaningful
insights into the similarities and differences in patterns of party competition in Europe (Marks
et al. 2006; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012). Its main disadvantage is that the relatively small
number of observations (parties) makes it difficult to test the validity of specific models at country
level and there is the added issue of whether relatively small and insignificant parties should be
considered equal to large and well-established parties when testing these models.3 Demand side
data such as that presented in this paper has the advantage of allowing us to infer dimensions
3As an example, if three very small parties, Politics Can be Different (LMP), “Together” (E14) and the Democratic
Coalition (DK), are removed from the CHES 2014 data, the correlation between economic and social left/right dimensions
for Hungary (see Table 1) would plummet from -0.09 to -0.90.
7from a large number of observations (respondents). The challenge, however, is one of making our
data representative of potential voters; surveys are costly, hard to administer and still often fail to
be representative across all relevant variables, while data from self-selected questionnaires such
as a VAA require complex methodological treatment to make them representative (see below).
De Vries and Marks also identify two distinct approaches for estimating dimensionality. The
first, the a priori approach, is a deductive approach that uses existing theory to define the most
salient dimensions ex ante and subsequently fit the data to these dimensions. The second is the a
posteriori approach that infers the dimensions as latent constructs from existing data on voter
opinions or party positions (De Vries and Marks 2012, 186). Benoit and Laver (2012) argue that
an a posteriori or inductive approach to extracting dimensions often produces incomprehensible
results. This is partly because such an approach assumes no prior knowledge as to which variables
(issues) are relevant and partly because it proves difficult to estimate the number of relevant
dimensions if inductive methods such as exploratory factor analysis or multi-dimensional scaling
are used without any prior knowledge of what these dimensions may be. At the same time, the a
priori approach to dimensionality, using as it does “a tried and tested conceptual language that
has evolved over generations” (Benoit and Laver 2012, 199), may lead us to miss significant and
rapid shifts in the structuring of political preferences, such as the emergence of new cleavages.
As such it is a conservative approach that assumes that the fundamental dimensions of political
contestation change only incrementally over the generations.
This paper uses both a priori and a posteriori approaches. Our main aim is to explore whether
the model of dimensionality proposed by Bakker et al. (2012) is the most appropriate one when
we look at the demand side of politics, i.e. ordinary voters. Thus, we test whether the three
dimensions used by Bakker et al. (one economic left-right dimension, one cultural TAN/GAL
dimension and one European dimension) also fit data that consist of the policy orientations of the
electorate. As a preliminary step, we assume the validity of these a priori defined dimensions
and test first whether or not the correlations between them observed on the supply side (see Table
1) also pertain to the demand side, and second whether these dimensions do indeed “fit” the data
as well as they do on the supply side. We then go on to use a more inductive or a posteriori
approach to identify the most relevant dimensions from the data for twenty EU member states and
see whether these better explain the policy space than the Bakker et al. model.
Beyond this principal aim, three specific features of the European policy space are of interest
to us, as they correspond to ongoing debates between scholars. The first is about the relationship
between the economic dimension and the cultural dimension. Canwe talk about a single “left-right”
dimension that aggregates both economic and cultural issues (Huber and Inglehart 1995), or do
economic and cultural issues form clearly distinct dimensions? If they exist as separate entities, do
these two dimensions correlate in opposite ways in western and post-communist Europe? (Marks
et al. 2006) The second is about the nature of the cultural dimension (if such a dimension exists).
Specifically, does it relate to “post-materialist” (TAN/GAL) issues as one group of scholars hold
(Marks et al. 2006; Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012) or does it instead draw from “transnational”
issues of “integration” versus “demarcation” (Kriesi et al. 2006)? This relates to a third debate
about whether issues of European integration form a separate dimension of their own (Bakker,
Jolly, and Polk 2012), form part of a cultural dimension (Kriesi et al. 2006) or integrate with the
cultural dimension in northern creditor countries and with the economic dimension in southern
debtor countries (Otjes and Katsanidou 2017). While the work of Bakker et al. (2012) provides
some insights into these three points from a supply side perspective, the aim of this paper is to
see whether the same patterns apply when we draw from the demand side.
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Of course, we would not necessarily expect the demand side to correspond to the supply
side. Voters “think much less ideologically” (Achen and Bartels 2002) and their opinions are
therefore a lot less coherent (and often contradictory) than party positions, which are designed to
be (more or less) ideologically consistent. It is therefore quite possible that the policy space as
defined by voters will not correspond, or will correspond only poorly, with that defined by parties.
Nevertheless, because we believe that it is the evolving preferences of voters that ultimately drive
party strategies, we also hold that understanding the policy space from the demand side is critical
to understanding the changing face of politics in Europe.
Data and Methods
The Data
The data consists of responses to policy statements from users of an online platform called
EUvox (Mendez and Manavopoulos 2018), a Voting Advice Application that was deployed in all
EU member states prior to the elections to the European Parliament (EP) in May 2014. VAAs
are online questionnaires that enable users to compare their policy preferences with those of
political parties (or election candidates) during an election campaign (for a recent, comprehensive
overview of how they work and are used in political science see Garzia and Marshall) (Garzia
and Marschall 2014). They provide users with a set of policy or issue statements to which they
respond with varying degrees of agreement or disagreement. The EUvox VAA matched user
responses with party positions that had been determined by expert coders and displayed these
matches visually. Supplementary questions on variables of interest to political scientists such as
socio–demographic characteristics (age, gender, education) and political behaviour (interest in
politics, party affiliation and vote intention both at the EP elections and in subsequent national
elections) were also included in the questionnaire.4
Turning to the subject of our study, political dimensionality, the great advantage of VAAs
as a data source is that they can provide a huge volume of opinion data on a large number of
diverse political issues. EUvox presented its respondents in all EU member states with thirty
issue statements, of which twenty-one were common to all country questionnaires, except for
France, which shared twenty of these. These items were selected to cover the issues identified by
the Chapel Hill Survey data and used by Bakker et al. to define their three-dimensional space
(economic left/right, social left/right or TAN/GAL, and EU) (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012;
Bakker et al. 2015). Seven issues were about the powers of the EU, seven were about economic
issues and seven were on cultural issues. These items are shown in Table 2 below and are marked
by the prefixes EU, Eco and Cul respectively. In addition, a further two items were shared by
many, but not all, country versions of the VAA: one on the role of Islam (shared by twelve versions
and identified as AD1 in Table 2) and one on the relative merits of environmental protection and
economic growth (shared by nine and identified as AD2). The remaining items were specific to
each country and will not be considered further in this analysis. The range of possible responses
to items formed a Likert-type scale consisting of “completely agree”, “agree”, “neither agree nor
disagree”, “disagree”, “completely disagree” with a sixth response—“no opinion”—treated as a
missing value. In the case of the United Kingdom, different versions of the VAA were provided
4Users were not required to answer these questions, although a majority did so. For the supplementary questions on
party affiliation and vote intention, the options ‘none’ and ‘undecided’ were also available.
9to English, Scottish, Welsh and Northern Irish voters. The England dataset is used for the UK as
it was accessed by a far larger number of respondents than the other three.
table 2: Common Policy Statements
Dim Keyword(s) Item
EU1 Euro Country X should exit the Euro (Eurozone countries)/ never adopt the Euro (non-Eurozone countries).
EU2 Treaty veto A single member state should be able to block a treaty change, even if all the other member states agree to it.
EU3 EU worker rights The right of EU citizens to work in Country X should be restricted.
EU4 EU foreign policy There should be a common EU foreign policy even if this limits the capacity of Country X to act independently.
EU5 EU redistribution The EU should redistribute resources from richer to poorer EU regions.
EU6 EU membership Overall, EU membership has been a bad thing for the Country X.
EU7 EU referendums EU treaties should be decided by [name of national parliament] rather than by citizens in a referendum.
Eco1 Privatising health care Free market competition makes the health care system function better. (except FR)
Eco2 Public sector employees The number of public sector employees should be reduced.
Eco3 State intervention The state should intervene as little as possible in the economy.
Eco4 Redistribution Wealth should be redistributed from the richest people to the poorest.
Eco5 Spending cuts Cutting government spending is a good way to solve the economic crisis.
Eco6 Hiring/Firing It should be easy for companies to fire people
Eco7 IMF role External loans from institutions such as the IMF are a good solution to crisis situations.
Cul1 Immigrants Immigrants must adapt to the values and culture of Country X.
Cul2 Privacy Restrictions on citizen privacy are acceptable in order to combat crime.
Cul3 Public order To maintain public order, governments should be able to restrict demonstrations.
Cul4 Crime/Punishment Less serious crimes should be punished with community service, not imprisonment.
Cul5 Gay rights Same sex couples should enjoy the same rights as heterosexual couples to marry.
Cul6 Abortion Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion.
Cul7 Drugs The recreational use of cannabis should be legal.
AD1 Islam Islam is a threat to Country X. (EN,DK,FR,AT,IT,ES,GR,CZ,SK,HU,SI,BG).
AD2 Environment Protecting the environment is more important than fostering economic growth. (FI,IE,DE,IT,ES,PL,HU,EE,BG).
For the purposes of the analysis, which involves several resampling iterations, we consider as
valid datasets those with an N>2,500 after cleaning and that are sufficiently balanced in terms of
age, gender, education, political interest and vote intention to generate data that is representative
of the voting population with respect to these variables after pre-processing. For details of how
this is done, see below and refer to the online Appendix. Data from six small states (Belgium,
Croatia, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg and Malta) failed to satisfy these criteria and in two other
states (the Netherlands and Sweden) separate VAAs were run with different questionnaires. This
left us with valid data from twenty member states. The raw number of entries from each country
(representing completed VAA questionnaires), the number of entries remaining after cleaning (to
weed out users who answered the VAA with undue haste and potential repeat users) and after
pre-processing (see below) are shown in Table 1 of the online Appendix.
Methods
As mentioned above, this paper uses both a priori and a posteriori approaches. We will now
expand on the methodological aspects of how we test these two approaches. The first stage of the
analysis replicates the correlational analysis used in Bakker et al. (2012) on our demand side
data. To that end we first use the a priori defined dimensional model of Bakker et al. (2012) in
which the policy space consists of one economic left-right dimension, one TAN/GAL (or social
left/right) dimension and one EU integration dimension. As mentioned above, Eco, Cul and EU
issue statements in EUvox were designed to correspond to these three dimensions. By drawing
on user responses to these statements we can calculate the demand side correlations between
the three dimensions and compare them with the supply side correlations calculated using the
methodology of Bakker et al. (2012). We do this by summing users’ positions on Eco, Cul and
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EU issues respectively to create a summated rating scale for each dimension, which is normalised
to a 0-1 value.5 However, we omit two of these statements: EU7 and Eco7 (see Table 2). We
omit EU7 (on EU referendums) because it is more about the issue of direct democracy than about
European integration and we omit Eco7 as it is also involves an issue of national sovereignty (the
power of a transnational organisation to guide domestic policy).6 Having assigned users their
scores we can then calculate the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between each dimension for
each national level dataset (just as Bakker et al. (2012) do for party positions).
The correlational analysis is the starting point of our empirical analysis. For the core analysis
we draw on psychometric scaling methods that are derived from Item Response Theory (IRT) and
apply these in two ways. First, we do so in a confirmatory mode to test the validity of a priori
defined dimensions, i.e., the three dimensional model that Bakker et al. (2012) found best fit the
CHES data. Second, we apply these methods in what has been referred to above as an a posteriori
manner to identify political dimensions. This second approach is particularly useful when a priori
defined dimensions turn out to be deficient. The objective in both cases is to identify reliable,
unidimensional scales from the item bank of policy statements. The unidimensionality criterion
is particularly important since the aim is to ensure that all items in a scale measure one, and only
one, latent trait.
The IRT–derived psychometric method we employ draws on Mokken’s (1971) monotone
homogeneity model, often referred to as Mokken scale analysis (MSA). As with factor analysis,
MSA can be used both as a confirmatory and exploratory method. However, when analysing
Likert items Mokken scaling has a number of advantages. Both van Schuur and Kiers and van der
Eijk and Rose provide quite convincing evidence that using factor analysis on ordered-categorical
survey items (so-called Likert items) often leads to over-dimensionalisation (Van Schuur and
Kiers 1994; Van der Eijk and Rose 2015). Furthermore, unlike factor analysis, MSA does not
make rigid distributional assumptions (Van Schuur 2003). No doubt because of these attractive
properties, MSA has already been used in other studies to identify latent political dimensions from
VAA-generated data (Germann et al. 2015; Katsanidou and Otjes 2016; Mendez and Wheatley
2014; Wheatley et al. 2014; Wheatley 2016).
In terms of the unidimensionality assessment, MSA generates a value H (also known as
Loevinger’s H) that is a measure of the consistency of the responses to a group of items, as well
as values Hj that measure the normed covariance between each item score and the rest score from
other items in the group. A group of items are said to form a scale (or dimension) if all Hj of
each item satisfy Hj  c, where c  0:3, and if all the items in the scale satisfy the monotone
homogeneity model, the principle that if an item score changes there is a corresponding change
in the latent trait (for more details, see the online Appendix). Items that belong to more than
one scale are not included in any scale. A scale is considered weak if Loevinger’s H  0:3, of
medium strength if H  0:4, and strong if H  0:5 (Mokken 1971).
Unlike the a priori approach, in which we use MSA as a confirmatory method to test the
validity of the three-dimensional model, the a posteriori analysis, and our implementation of it, is
a data-driven exercise in which we do not place any restrictions on the composition and/or number
of unidimensional scales identified. In this second, exploratory mode, a scaling algorithm searches
the item bank for the longest feasible unidimensional scales (for details, see the online Appendix).
Taking into account Benoit and Laver’s (2012) criticisms of the a posteriori approach, we should
point out that this approach is not purely inductive since the focus on three themes—economy,
5Before calculating the sum, where appropriate we reverse items so that they all point in the same direction. We do
not calculate a users’ position on a given dimension if any of the responses to the relevant issue statements is “no opinion”.
6In the case of France we also omit Eco1 as this item was not used in the French version of the VAA.
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culture and the EU—in the questionnaire draws explicitly from the existing literature as to which
variables are relevant. Gemenis describes this technique as “quasi-inductive” because it can be
distinguished from a purely inductive exercise insofar as the policy items used in the analysis are
inevitably pre-selected (Gemenis 2013). Thus, the inductive component refers to the method of
analysis we use to extract latent dimensions from user responses to a relatively large battery of
pre–selected policy items. What such a method does not predetermine, however, are the issues
that belong to each dimension or, indeed, whether issues belong to any relevant dimension at all.
We do recognise, however, that, as Benoit and Laver point out, “the attribution of spatial
characteristics to policy differences is essentially a metaphor” (Benoit and Laver 2012, 195) and
there is no “correct” number of dimensions to extract. This is also illustrated by Bakker et al.
(2012), who find that, while a three-dimensional solution is the optimal model for describing
party policy positions in all EU countries, in some cases (such as the United Kingdom) it is
only a marginally better fit than lower dimensional solutions. Similarly, in our analysis we must
acknowledge that setting 0.3 as a minimum threshold for H and Hj , a convention established by
Mokken and now widely used, is rather arbitrary and could generate different solutions if altered.
MSA in its confirmatory mode is therefore applied in each dataset to the a priori defined
dimensions, i.e. it is applied separately to the same groups of Cul, Eco and EU items (minus Eco7
and EU7) that we used to calculate the correlations.7 This allows us to test the explanatory power
of the a priori model in describing the European political spaces. In the a posteriori approach
to extracting dimensions MSA is applied to all twenty-one common (Eco, Cul and EU) items
for each national level dataset. Items that are found to belong to more than one scale are not
considered. We then carry out a second round of MSA on most datasets, this time including the
additional items on Islam and the environment (AD1 and AD2) that are shared by some, but not
all, country versions. This is done to check whether the dimensions we extract are stable if other
possibly relevant items are added. In both rounds a set of items is deemed to form a scale only if
it numbers at least three items.
Pre-processing
We conclude this section with a short note on a final, crucial step that we undertake before
carrying out the analysis described above. This is pre-processing. As mentioned above, the main
drawback of using the responses of VAA users to map the dimensionality of the policy space is
that these users form a self-selected, rather than a representative sample. Not only are the political
affiliations of VAA users often systematically skewed, but users tend to be disproportionately
young, well-educated and interested in politics (Marschall 2014). Fortunately, there are a variety
of ways in which VAA-data can be made more representative using post-stratification weighting
techniques. One such approach that is popular among survey researchers is raking.8 Raking uses
the marginal distributions of each variable in an iterative process that assigns weights until the
weighted survey distributions approximate the distributions of the target population.
While deriving post-stratfication weights is fairly straightforward, one immediate problem
that arises is that MSA cannot be performed on weighted data. This is not only an issue related to
our choice of method for conducting dimensionality analysis. The problem would remain if we
7Note that once again the item Eco1 is not used in the case of France.
8On raking see (Deville, Särndal, and Sautory 1993), for an application of raking to VAA-data see (Nezi and
Katsanidou 2014).
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were using factor analysis when the data consists of ordered survey items.9 To overcome this
problem we used a post-survey calibration approach that works in similar ways to raking.
The first step in this pre-processing phase is to identify the target population. In our case it is
“voters”, rather than the general population. This is an important distinction since VAA-generated
data are more likely to be representative of voters than non-voters. As with raking, the next step
is to select the core calibration variables and derive reliable estimates of the target population
parameters. We chose four such variables: (1) age by education (joint distribution), (2) gender, (3)
political interest and (4) voting intention. For the first three parameters we derived estimates of
the distribution among the “voting population” from the European Social Survey. For the voting
intention variable we simply used the party vote share from the EP elections in each country. The
calibration algorithm then works like raking but instead of generating a vector of weights per
respondent, it returns a resampled, non-weighted dataset (Djouvas and Mendez 2018). Herein
lies one advantage of using VAA-data where it is possible to retain—at least for some cases—a
reasonably large dataset of observations that is calibrated on core variables of interest without
using weights. This was the case for more than half the EUvox datasets.
For eight of the country cases it was not possible to achieve satisfactory convergence in terms
of the number of observations retained. For these specific countries we used a two step procedure.
We first used raking to derive truncated replication weights, ensuring that in no case the maximum
weight was greater than 8. The fractional weights were then rounded to the nearest integer to
generate a new dataset with replicates (note that this is how some popular statistical packages,
such as SPSS, perform weighted analysis). In step two we applied the calibration algorithm
to the raked dataset to return a new resampled dataset on which the MSA could be performed.
A detailed description of the pre-processing stage is included in the first section of the online
Appendix.
Results
Our results are presented in the two sections below. We first deal with the correlation analysis
and the comparison of supply side and demand side results before moving on to the core of our
empirical analysis, the Mokken Scale Analysis.
Correlational analysis
Applying the preliminary stage of analysis to the national level EUvox datasets and calculating
the correlations between the a priori defined dimensions, we find that rather similar trends pertain
on the demand side as Bakker et al. (2012) and Marks et al. (2006) observe on the supply
side. The demand side correlations are shown in Table 3. First of all, economic left-right and
social left-right (TAN/GAL) correlate positively in all western European countries and negatively
in all post-communist countries except Slovenia (strongly) and Estonia (marginally). In most
post-communist countries these negative correlations are mainly rather small, except in the case
of Hungary. It is worth noting that the findings with respect to Hungary and Slovenia (a strong
negative correlation in the case of the former and a strong positive correlation in the case of the
latter) are precisely the same trends as those identified by Bakker et al. (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk
9When conducting factor analysis on ordinal data polychoric correlations should be used as the input matrix. This
does not lend itself to weighting.
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2012, 229). In Spain and, to a somewhat lesser extent, Austria, England and France, the negative
correlations are particularly strong, a trend that can also be seen in Table 1.
table 3: EUvox correlations, 2014
Country
Economic and
social left/right
Economic left/
right and EU
Social left/
right and EU
Austria 0.37 -0.21 -0.34
Bulgaria -0.23 0.30 -0.24
Cyprus 0.21 0.40 0.01
Czech Republic -0.05 -0.05 -0.08
Denmark 0.40 -0.10 -0.31
England 0.54 -0.60 -0.61
Estonia 0.09 0.16 -0.09
Finland 0.26 -0.05 -0.39
France 0.46 -0.12 -0.42
Germany 0.39 -0.25 -0.33
Greece 0.29 0.35 0.03
Hungary -0.38 0.38 -0.52
Ireland 0.33 -0.05 -0.03
Italy 0.29 -0.26 -0.30
Poland -0.13 0.03 -0.24
Portugal 0.36 0.21 0.01
Romania -0.09 0.08 -0.15
Slovakia -0.23 0.23 -0.20
Slovenia 0.39 0.20 0.04
Spain 0.59 -0.09 -0.10
Looking now at the correlations between the EU dimension and the social left-right dimension
for the EUvox datasets, we find that these two dimensions appear to be more or less orthogonal in
Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Slovenia. In all other countries a negative correlation is
observed (meaning that TAN respondents tend to be more Eurosceptic), which is particularly
marked in England, Finland, France and Hungary—a trend observed also in Table 1 except in the
case of France. In Spain, only a weak negative correlation is observed. While Table 1 suggests a
positive correlation on the supply side for all so-called “bail out” countries except Greece, Table
3 suggests that in these cases (with the partial exception of Spain) the two dimensions are more
or less independent. Table 3 also groups Greece together with other bail-out countries (unlike
Table 1). As in Table 1, these countries are set apart as they do not share the same rather strong
negative correlations observed in non bail-out countries. Once again, generally speaking, the
demand side correlations correspond well with the supply side correlations.
Finally, the correlations between the EU dimension and the economic left-right dimension
shown in Table 3 provide a mixed bag, just as they do in Table 1. While two southern debtor
countries, Cyprus and Greece (as well as Hungary), exhibit a strong positive correlation, with
the economic right associated with pro-EU positions and the economic left with Eurosceptic
positions, the opposite trend prevails in Austria, Germany and, most notably, England. These
countries exhibit similar trends in Table 1, although with different intensities.
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To sum up, while the coefficients in Tables 1 and 3 are very different—and we would expect
them to be different given the fact that, as mentioned above, political parties (unlike voters)
need to express a clear and consistent political standpoint—groups of countries often express
very similar tendencies when viewed from a demand perspective as they do from the supply
perspective. This applies above all to the correlations between economic left-right and social
left-right (TAN/GAL) but also holds for some correlations involving the EU dimension.
Scaling analysis
Correlational analysis can only take us so far in our endeavour to analyse dimensionality. We now
move on to a more robust form of analysis, namely the application of MSA. This analysis first
involves “validating” the a priori defined dimensions. To what extent do these constitute reliable
and unidimensional scales? Applying MSA in its confirmatory mode will allow us to answer this
questions. If we apply it to the pre-defined groups of Eco, Cul and EU items (excluding Eco7 and
EU7) we find that these dimensions are rarely scalable. Table 2 in the online appendix gives the
H coefficients when MSA is applied to the items of the a priori defined dimensions, as well as
(in brackets) the number of items that satisfy the condition Hj  0:3. It is extremely rare that
all items in any dimension fulfil this condition and in most cases the scale as a whole fails to
satisfy the overall H  0:3 condition. Not only that, but many items that do satisfy Hj  0:3
would also form a scale if combined with items from another a priori defined dimension. This
applies particularly, but not exclusively, to the Cul and EU scales. Overall Cul (TAN/GAL) items
scale particularly poorly when MSA is applied as the consistently low values of H suggest.
Since a validation of the a priori defined dimensions using MSA yielded deficient scales we
now apply MSA in its exploratory mode to identify unidimensional scales. This a posteriori part
of the analysis involved multiple iterations of MSA for each of the twenty country samples. The
relevant MSA coefficients both for the twenty-one common items alone and for these items plus
items AD1 and AD2 (in cases in which they are present) are provided in Tables 3-31 of the online
Appendix.
In order to summarise this complex analysis rather more briefly we shall rely on the heat map
visualisation shown in Figure 1 to represent the results of the scaling analysis for nineteen of
the twenty datasets. Romania is not included as no unidimensional scales could be identified
when MSA was applied. The columns in the heat maps represent each unidimensional scale that
satisfies the Mokken scalability criteria (see above). Non-scalable items are depicted by empty
white cells in the heat maps.10 We use colour shading, as shown in the legends, to indicate an
item’s scalability and, in the last row of each column, to show the overall strength of a scale as
measured by Loevinger’s H. The heat maps refer to analysis of the twenty-one common items
only, but reference will be made in the subsequent paragraphs to any relevant changes in the
dimensional structure that result from including AD1 and/or AD2.
As can be seen from the heat maps in Figure 1, a number of broad patterns emerge if we
apply MSA to each of the national level datasets, although these mask considerable heterogeneity.
None of the cases adheres to a three-dimensional model with separate economic, cultural and
EU dimensions. First, we find a group of seven countries in which politics is defined by two
dimensions—one cultural/EU dimension and one economic dimension. The heat maps for this
group are shown in Figure 1a. England is something of a special case here; a one-dimensional
solution defined by a single left-right dimension that includes economic, cultural and EU issues
is also possible (see Table 10 in the online Appendix), but the two dimensions separate when
10An absent item not included in the questionnaire, the health care item in France, is represented by a grey cell.
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Figure 1: Heatmaps depicting results of Mokken Scaling Analysis
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(c) One-dimensional solutions
the minimum threshold c for Hj is raised to 0.45. In all seven cases the cultural/EU dimension
embraces a variegated mix of issues including immigration (in six cases), gay rights (in four
cases), abortion (in one case) and a variety of EU integration issues (in all cases). Although in the
case of Denmark it appears that this dimension exclusively refers to EU items, if we include AD1
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(on Islam) into the analysis (AD2 was not used in the VAA questionnaire), we find that not only
does this item load onto the same dimension as the EU items, but its inclusion also brings Cul1
(immigrants) into this dimension (see Table 9 in the online appendix). In the cases of Austria
and Italy too, at first glance the cultural/EU dimension seems to be dominated by EU items with
only one cultural item (Cul1) present. However, in both cases AD1 can be aggregated into this
dimension and in the case of Italy its inclusion brings Cul5 (gay rights) into the scale as well (see
Table 24 of the online Appendix). For the group as a whole, the economic dimension embraces a
number of classical left-right issues on privatisation, state intervention and spending cuts, but in
most of these cases it is the cultural/EU dimension that is the dominant of the two, embracing
more issues and/or exhibiting stronger covariance as evidenced by higher values of H. Overall this
group of countries consists of relatively economically stable, mainly northern European countries.
The remaining countries are far more heterogeneous in terms of the dimensional structure
identified. Cyprus and Slovenia exhibit a two-dimensional structure with one economic and
one cultural dimension, but, unlike the first group of countries, most EU issues belong to the
economic dimension, not the cultural dimension (see Figure 1b). In both cases at least two items
(on the Euro and on EU membership) form a part of the economic dimension, as does one cultural
item (on public order) in the case of Cyprus. Despite its apparent one-dimensional structure,
Greece can also be said to belong to this small group of countries as the defining dimension
incorporates a mix of EU and economic items (see Figure 1c). Moreover, if AD1 is included,
a second (cultural) dimension emerges incorporating three issues: EU3 (on EU worker rights),
Cul5 (gay rights) and AD1 (Islam). For more details, see Table 20 of the online Appendix. Note
that in the Greek case, as in the case of Cyprus, the item on public order (Cul3) aggregates onto
the economic/EU dimension, despite it being ostensibly a cultural issue. It is also worthy of note
that one EU item (on EU worker rights) integrates into the cultural dimension in the cases of both
Greece and Cyprus. In all three cases the economic dimension is dominant and in the case of
Greece it is the only dimension to emerge if twenty-one items are used.
Two other cases worthy of mention are the cases of Spain (Figure 1b) and Hungary (Figure 1c).
Spain exhibits a two-dimensional structure with one EU dimension that includes just three items
and one broad Left-Right dimension that aggregates four economic items and six cultural items,
and distinguishes an economic right TAN position from an economic left GAL position. Hungary
exhibits a reverse pattern with a single dimension that aggregates not only economic and cultural
issues but also EU issues, and, unlike Spain, separates economically left-wing, Eurosceptic social
conservatives from economically right-wing Europhile social liberals.
As for the remaining two dimensional cases shown in Figure 1b, all scales are relatively
small (never aggregating more than four items) and are mainly restricted to a single category
(EU, Eco or Cul). In the Irish case we observe an EU dimension that also includes an item on
the role of another transnational organisation (the IMF, Eco7) and a small cultural dimension
that aggregates lifestyle issues (Cul5, Cul6 and Cul7). In Slovakia and Portugal the analysis
reveals distinct economic and cultural dimensions, but EU issues neither aggregate onto these nor
form a separate dimension of their own. Finally, in the Czech Republic an EU dimension and an
economic dimension emerge, but cultural items do not aggregate onto any scale.
In addition to Greece and Hungary, there are three other cases in which we can identity only
one dimension (see Figure 1c). These are Poland, Bulgaria and Estonia. The defining dimension
in Poland aggregates three EU issues with two cultural items (on gay rights and abortion), with a
pro-EU position associated with a more tolerant attitude towards both cultural issues. Bulgaria
and Estonia are characterised by a single dimension that only aggregates EU issues.
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It is worth noting that in none of the cases in which AD2 (the environment) was included in
the VAA did these issues load onto the cultural dimension, as one would expect if the cultural
dimension corresponded to the TAN/GAL model. Indeed AD2 loaded onto neither dimension in
any of the nine cases in which it was used. AD1 (Islam), on the other hand, tended to integrate
into the cultural dimension, especially in the first group of seven countries (for more details see
the relevant Tables in the online Appendix).
Discussion
The first point that is worthy of note is that in terms of the correlations between the a priori defined
dimensions, some common patterns can be observed between the demand side (i.e. EUvox users)
and the supply side (CHES 2014 party positions). This applies particularly to the correlations
between the economic left-right and social left-right (TAN/GAL) dimensions and lends added
weight to the original hypothesis of Marks et al. (2006) that these two dimensions correlate in
opposite directions in West European and post-communist countries (compare Table 1 and Table
3). Some credence should also be given to Rovny’s (2014) hypothesis that countries that had
previously belonged to communist federations tend to buck this trend insofar as in these countries
the two dimensions tend to correlate in the same way as they do inWestern Europe. Both successor
states to communist-era federations that we analyse (Slovenia and Estonia) appear to confirm
Rovny’s hypothesis. Another common feature that the demand side and the supply side seem to
share is that in most so-called “bail-out” countries, as well as in Slovenia, the close association
between TAN values and Euroscepticism (and between GAL values and pro-EU positions) that is
observed in other countries does not seem to pertain. Finally, the strong correlations observed in
the extreme or deviant examples of Spain, England, Hungary and Slovenia are observed in the
demand side just as in the supply side (see Tables 1 and 3) (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012).
A significant feature of the demand side analysis of EUvox data, however, is that those issues
that the Chapel Hill group of scholars propose form the TAN/GAL dimension (Marks et al. 2006;
Bakker et al. 2015; Rovny 2014; Hooghe and Marks 2018) fail to form a scale when we apply
MSA. This first becomes evident when we apply MSA to the three a priori defined Eco, Cul and
EU dimensions. We find that not only do these groups of items overall fail to constitute scales as
defined by Mokken (1971), but the TAN/GAL items scale particularly badly (see Table 2 of the
online appendix).
The reasons for this become clearer when we look at the dimensions that emerge when we
perform MSA a posteriori. In the first group of seven mainly Northern European countries
Cul1 (immigrants) and Cul 5 (gay rights) tend to scale with EU items, while the other Cul items
generally do not form part of any scale at all. In other cases Cul5, Cul6 (abortion) and Cul7
(drugs) sometimes form a mini scale of their own. Issue AD2 on the environment does not appear
to integrate into this dimension at all, as the label “TAN/GAL” would imply. Similarly, in no
case did items involving law and order or civil liberties (Cul2, Cul3 and Cul4) form a common
dimension with other TAN/GAL issues, nor did they form a libertarian-authoritarian dimension
of their own as Kitschelt (2013) suggests. In the cases of Greece and Cyprus, Cul 3 (on whether
governments should restrict demonstrations) instead integrated with the economic dimension,
perhaps because this issue was linked in the public mind with the right to protest against austerity.
In the first group of seven countries, the cultural dimension relates far more to identity-related
issues of universalism versus particularism (Beramendi et al. 2015b; Häusermann and Kriesi
2015) (“open” versus “closed”) than to archetypal TAN/GAL issues; as well as immigration
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and gay rights, this dimension embraces EU-related issues and the role of Islam. This group of
countries consists of relatively wealthy Northern European countries, which would appear to
corroborate Otjes and Katsanidou’s (2017) hypothesis that in Northern European countries issues
of EU integration are associated with the cultural dimension of political competition.
However, this pattern is not shared by all countries; in Greece, Cyprus and Slovenia, it is
the economic dimension that encompasses issues of EU integration. It is worthy of note that
Greece and Cyprus both received a bailout under the condition of slashing public spending, while
Slovenia only avoided this by imposing equally harsh austerity measures of its own. Thus, the
hypothesis of Otjes and Katsanidou (2017) that issues of EU integration would aggregate onto
the economic dimension in the Southern European debtor states seems to be supported in these
cases. This can perhaps be explained by the fact that in these countries, many of the “losers” of
recent economic transformations are relatively well-educated young people, who are less likely
to be convinced by culturally exclusive “right-wing” narratives and instead direct their anger at
economic austerity. As Hooghe and Marks point out, in these debtor countries—which include
Spain, Ireland and Portugal as well—“austerity and currency inflexibility produced economic
misery and resentment which was mobilized chiefly by the radical left” (Hooghe and Marks 2018,
9). It is interesting to note that none of these countries, except for Greece, have a significant
radical (culturally) right-wing party, but instead have relatively large radical left-wing parties
(SYRIZA in Greece, Podemos in Spain, the Left Bloc in Portugal, Sinn Fein in Ireland and the
United Left in Slovenia). In Greece, the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn, while significant, garners far
fewer votes than SYRIZA, which won two general elections held in 2015. At the same time we
must recognise that while our a posteriori application of MSA seems to reveal a strong association
between certain EU and certain economic issues in three countries, that it does not do so in the
cases of Portugal, Spain and Ireland suggests that Otjes and Katsanidou’s hypothesis provides
only a partial explanation.
Despite the fact that the patterns emerging from our demand side a posteriori approach are
rather different from those that Bakker et al. (2012) identify from the supply side, certain common
features can still be discerned from the two sets of patterns. If we look at the relationship between
the economic and cultural dimensions, two rather opposite and exceptional cases that emerge from
Bakker et al. (2012) also emerge as distinct cases from our own findings. These are Spain on the
one hand, and Hungary on the other, which respectively exhibit very strong positive and negative
correlations between the economic left-right dimension and the social left-right dimension when
we look at party positions as derived from CHES (Bakker, Jolly, and Polk 2012, 229). These two
cases also appear exceptional when we derive dimensions a posteriori from EUvox data; in both
cases economic left-right and TAN/GAL issues aggregate onto a single dimension. However, in
Spain this dimension runs from economic left/GAL to economic right/TAN, while in Hungary it
runs from economic left/TAN to economic right/GAL. This fully corroborates the findings of the
supply side study.
Another common feature that can be discerned, albeit less clearly, is the relationship between
cultural TAN/GAL and EU issues. Generally speaking, the supply side data both from the
2006 CHES and from the 2014 CHES (see Table 1) suggests that in most countries, with the
exception of most so-called “bail out” countries, there is a strong association between TAN
and Euroscepticism amongst European political parties (and, by implication, between GAL and
pro-EU positions). Our demand side studies on Northern Europe suggest that, at least from the
perspective of the electorate, EU issues actually form part of the same dimension as some of
the so-called TAN/GAL issues and this may go some way towards explaining the association
between these groups of issues. Here, however, we must express the caveat that the trends that
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emerge from the supply side data are not particularly consistent; this could be, as suggested above,
because the weight given to relatively insignificant parties may buck the trend.
conclusion
A comparison of the results of demand and supply side studies into the dimensionality of the
political space in Europe reveals both a number of similarities and some stark differences. It
remains for us to close with a few brief comments on both the nature of these similarities
and differences and on the methodological strengths and weaknesses of the two very different
approaches.
We use the term “dimension” to refer to a bundle of issues that are deemed to be associated
with one another in such a way that to know the position of a party or voter on one issue allows a
reasonable degree of confidence in predicting her/his/its position on another issue from the same
bundle. This study has shown that there is some correspondence between the sorts of correlations
that are observed between the same bundles on the supply side (i.e. party data from the CHES)
on the one hand, and on the demand side (EUvox data) on the other. A key similarity here is
the way the bundle of issues that are commonly seen as economic left-right issues correlates
with the bundle of issues that are described as TAN/GAL (Marks et al. 2006; Bakker, Jolly, and
Polk 2012). From both sets of data we observe a tendency for these two bundles to correlate in
one direction in Western European countries and in the opposite direction in most (but not all)
post-communist countries.
Where the two approaches differ, however, is that the bundles of issues that are said to
constitute dimensions on the supply side do not seem to do so on the demand side. This applies
first and foremost to the so-called TAN/GAL dimension; issues associated with TAN/GAL appear
to be associated only very weakly with one another when viewed from the demand side. If we
look at the demand side data from EUvox we find that issues involving civil liberties, law and
order and environmentalism do not form a part of the cultural dimension and in some countries
(Cyprus, Greece) issues of civil liberties and law and order even form a part of the economic
dimension. This leaves the cultural dimension either restricted to a few moral-cultural issues
(e.g. gay rights, abortion, drug use) or forming a broader identity-based dimension that also
incorporates EU issues.
This leads to another major difference between the two sets of findings. While supply side
studies suggest that a three-dimensional model best fits the data, our demand side study suggests
that it does not and that different bundles of issues group together and form dimensions in
different ways in different countries. This particularly applies to the cultural dimension of political
competition. In a group of Northern European countries, issues of EU integration aggregate
with issues of immigration, gay rights and perception of Islam to form a broader identity-based
dimension based on a divide between universalism and particularism or “open versus closed”. In
other countries, however, EU issues either aggregate with an economic left-right dimension, form
a separate dimension of their own, or do not aggregate into any dimension at all.
That we observe differences should not surprise us. We are, after all, comparing two very
different types of study. On the one hand we have a study that defines dimensions a priori and
uses as its theoretical starting point the positions of parties, i.e. the supply side, while on the other
we have a study that defines dimensions a posteriori and draws from the position of the electorate
on the demand side. We also use different statistical methods for extracting dimensions: factor
analysis on the one hand and Mokken Scale Analysis on the other.
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We must be aware that no single methodology provides a “correct” account of dimensionality.
Fundamentally, of course, the supply side and demand side approaches are measuring different
things: in one we are trying to understand patterns of competition between parties; in the other
we are interested in the political orientations of voters. One strength of the approach of this paper
is that identifying political dimensions from a demand side perspective allows us to infer the
underlying cleavages that divide our societies from the dimensions we identify. As an example,
this paper presents evidence that the cultural dimension in many Northern European countries
corresponds more closely to “closed” vs “open” than to TAN vs GAL. This in turn implies that
in these countries the patterns of political competition that we observe today on the demand
side may be linked to the new cleavage between “winners” and “losers” of globalisation (Kriesi
et al. 2006; Kriesi et al. 2008), also referred to as the “transnational cleavage” (Hooghe and
Marks 2018). Indeed cleavage theory suggests that demand side dynamics go on to determine
supply side dynamics. Kriesi et al. suggest that parties re-position themselves strategically to
accommodate the political demand engendered by the new cleavage (Kriesi et al. 2006, 923),
while Hooghe and Marks (2018) hold that this new demand side pressure may bring about a
radical break in the party system and the formation of new parties. It is therefore possible that
demand side dimensionality is a harbinger of supply side dimensionality in the future. However,
this hypothesis is highly speculative and should be left to future researchers.
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